Introduction to cryptology (GBIN8U16)

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Message Authentication Codes, Authenticated Encryption

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Authentication (in crypto)

Crypto is not all about encrypting. One may also want to:

- Get access to a building/car/spaceship
- Electronically sign a contract/software/Git repository
- Detect tampering on a message
- Detect "identity theft"
- Etc.

$\Rightarrow$ domain of digital signatures and/or message authentication codes (MACs)

A major rule

In the case of a symmetric channel with potentially active adversaries (e.g. on a network):

- It may be fine to only authenticate
- It is *never okay* to only encrypt

$\Rightarrow$ "Authenticated encryption" (This is hard to do properly.)

Today: MACs (symmetric authentication)

Message authentication code (MAC)

A MAC is a mapping $\mathcal{M} : \mathcal{K}(\times\mathcal{N}) \times \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{T}$ that maps a key, message (and possibly a (random) nonce) to a *tag*.

- $\mathcal{K}$ is for instance $\{0,1\}^{128}$ (key space, secret)
- $\mathcal{N}$ is for instance $\{0,1\}^{64}$ ("nonce" space, public, either "random" or not)
- $\mathcal{X}$ is for instance $\{0,1\}^{*}$ (message space)
- $\mathcal{T}$ is for instance $\{0,1\}^{256}$ ("tag" space)

$\Rightarrow$ The tag is a "link" between a message and a key

- Note: MACs are not the *only* way to provide authentication

MACs: what do we want?

Given a MAC $\mathcal{M}(k, \cdot)$ with an unknown key, it should be hard to:

- Given m, find t s.t. $\mathcal{M}(k, m) = t$ (*Universal forgery*)
- Find m, t s.t. $\mathcal{M}(k, m) = t$ (*Existential forgery*)
- (Of course, retrieving k leads to those)

UF: ability to forge a tag for **any** message

EF: ability to forge a tag for **some** messages

UF $\Rightarrow$ EF

MACs: really, what do we want?

More generally, we want $\mathcal{M}(k, \cdot)$ to be like a "variable input-length (pseudo-) random function"

$\rightsquigarrow$ (VIL-) PRF security (remember?):

- An adversary has access to an oracle $\mathbb{O}$
- In one world, $\mathbb{O} \twoheadleftarrow \text{Func}(\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{T})$
- In another, $k \twoheadleftarrow \mathcal{K}$, $\mathbb{O} = \mathcal{M}(k, \cdot)$
- The adversary cannot tell in which world he lives

Where $\text{Func}(\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{T})$ are the functions from the message to the tag space

$\rightsquigarrow$ Define $\mathbf{Adv}^{\text{PRF}}$ in the same way as $\mathbf{Adv}^{\text{PRP}}$

VIL-PRF $\Rightarrow$ UF, but the converse is not true (Exercise: can you show why?)

So, how to build a MAC?

- From scratch
- Using a block cipher in a “MAC mode”
- Ditto, with a hash function
- Using a “polynomial” hash function
- Etc.

MACs from block ciphers: CBC-MAC example

Observation:

- The last block of CBC-ENC(m) “strongly depends” on the entire message
- $\Rightarrow$ Take $\mathrm{MAC}(m) = \mathrm{LastBlockOf}(\text{CBC-ENC}(m))$
- Not quite secure as is, but overall a sound idea

Advantage:

- “Only” needs a block cipher

Disadvantage:

- Not the fastest approach

MACs from hash functions 1

If $\mathcal{H} : \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^n$ is a hash function, one may define:

- $\mathtt{PrefixMAC}_{\mathcal{H}} : \{0,1\}^\kappa \times \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^n$ as $\mathtt{PrefixMAC}_{\mathcal{H}}(k,m) = \mathcal{H}(k||m)$
- $\mathtt{SuffixMAC}_{\mathcal{H}} : \{0,1\}^\kappa \times \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^n$ as $\mathtt{SuffixMAC}_{\mathcal{H}}(k,m) = \mathcal{H}(m||k)$
- (Note that $\mathtt{PrefixMAC}_{\mathcal{H}} \approx \mathtt{SuffixMAC}_{\mathcal{H}^{\triangleleft}}$, where $\mathcal{H}^{\triangleleft}$ is $\mathcal{H}$ "reversed")

These constructions are fine *generically* but may be weak for some specific hash functions

Length-extension attack for $\texttt{PrefixMAC}$

Let $\mathcal{H}$ be a narrow-pipe Merkle-Damgård hash function

- Let $h = \mathcal{H}(m)$ for some m
- Then $\mathcal{H}(\text{pad}(m)\|m') = \mathcal{H}_h(m')$ (with $\mathcal{H}_h(\cdot)$ the function $\mathcal{H}$ with its IV replaced by h)

What consequence for the security of $\texttt{PrefixMAC}_{\mathcal{H}}$?

- Assume an adversary knows m, $t = \texttt{PrefixMAC}_{\mathcal{H}}(k, m)$ and $\kappa = |k|$
- Then $t' = \mathcal{H}'_t(m') = \texttt{PrefixMAC}_{\mathcal{H}}(k, \text{pad}(m)\|m')$
  - ($\mathcal{H}'$ is $\mathcal{H}$ with an appropriately modified padding)

$\Rightarrow$ Existential forgeries are trivial!

(NB: Problems also exist for $\texttt{SuffixMAC}_{\mathcal{H}}$)

(NB: Similar attacks apply to raw CBC-MAC from two slides ago)

MACs from hash functions 2

How to defend against the previous attack?

- Use a better $\mathcal{H}$ framework, e.g. a *wide-pipe* Merkle-Damgård hash function (e.g. SHA-512/256) or a sponge (e.g. SHA-3)
- Use a Sandwich MAC construction (e.g. `HMAC`, SandwichMAC, ...)

`HMAC` (Bellare et al., 1996):

- Let $\mathcal{H}$ be a hash function with b-bit blocks, pad a function that pads to b bits with zeroes, $\texttt{opad} = \texttt{0x36}^{b/8}$, $\texttt{ipad} = \texttt{0x5C}^{b/8}$
- Then $\texttt{HMAC}_{\mathcal{H}}(k, m) = \mathcal{H}(\text{pad}(k) \oplus \texttt{opad} \| \mathcal{H}(\text{pad}(k) \oplus \texttt{ipad} \| m))$

HMAC facts

- HMAC is secure up to the birthday bound (of its hash function)
- It only needs *black-box* calls to a hash function ⇒ simple to implement (if one has internal access to the hash function, the NMAC variant is slightly more efficient)
- It is popular (widespread use in e.g. TLS)
- It is overkill if $\mathcal{H}$ is e.g. wide-pipe
- Some variants exist, some being more efficient

Block cipher v. Hash-based MACs

Block cipher and Hash-based MACs both use a black box to build a MAC, but

- Block cipher block sizes are usually "small" (e.g. 64/128 bits) $\rightsquigarrow$ somewhat limited generic security
- Hash functions are more efficient at processing large amounts of data

$\Rightarrow$ Hash-based MACs tend to be used more than block cipher-based

- But both loose in speed against polynomial MACs (e.g. VMAC) or dedicated constructions (e.g. PelicanMAC)

Introducing Authenticated-Encryption

The "modern" view:
If you must never encrypt w/o authentication, why separating the two? $\Rightarrow$ Authenticated-Encryption

- Maybe more efficient (less redundancy)?
- Maybe more secure (no careless combinations)?
- Maybe more complex

$\rightsquigarrow$ AEAD (Authenticated-Encryption with Associated Data)

AEAD

AEAD

An AEAD scheme is a pair of mappings $(\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{D})$ with:
$\mathcal{E} : \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{N} \times \mathcal{A} \times \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{C}$
$\mathcal{D} : \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{C} \to \mathcal{X} \cup \{\perp\}$

- $\mathcal{E}$ encrypts a message from $\mathcal{X}$ with a key and a nonce, and authenticates it together with associated data from $\mathcal{A}$
- $\mathcal{D}$ decrypts a ciphertext and returns the message if authentication is successful, or $\perp$ ("bottom") otherwise
- Security is typically analysed w.r.t. IND-CPA (for confidentiality) and IND-CTXT (for integrity)

AEAD designs

An AEAD scheme can be built in many ways:

- By combining a BC mode w/ a MAC (e.g. CCM: CTR mode + a CBC-MAC; GCM: CTR mode + a polynomial MAC)
- As a single BC mode (e.g. OCB)
- From a permutation/sponge consruction (e.g. Keyak)
- From a hash function (e.g. OMD)
- From a variable input-length wide-block block cipher (e.g. AEZ)
- Etc.

AEAD: A quick VIL-WBC idea

If $\mathcal{E} : \mathcal{K} \times \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^n$ is a block cipher, one can encrypt *and* authenticate any message m of fixed length $b < n$ by:

- Computing $c = \mathcal{E}(k, m||0^{n-b}||r)$
- Decrypting c to m iff. $\mathcal{E}^{-1}(k, c) = m||0^{n-b}||*$

If $\mathcal{E}$ is "good" (w.r.t. the *SPRP* security notion (Q: why isn't PRP enough here?)), it is "hard" for an adversary to forge $\hat{c}$ s.t. $\mathcal{E}^{-1}(\hat{c})$ has $n - b$ zeroes at specific positions (roughly: success prob. $\approx 2^{b-n}$)

$\rightsquigarrow$ Good paradigm, but very limited if $\mathcal{E}$ has typical block size $n \leq 256$

VIL-WBC

(VIL)-[W]BC

A *Variable input-length wide block cipher* is a family $\mathcal{W} = \{\mathcal{E}^\ell\}$ of mappings $\mathcal{E}^\ell : \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{X}_\ell \to \mathcal{X}_\ell$ s.t. for all ℓ, $\mathcal{E}^\ell$ is a block cipher, where $\ell \in \mathcal{S} \subseteq \mathbb{N}$

- One can for instance take $\mathcal{X}_\ell = \{0,1\}^\ell$, $\ell \in [2^7, 2^{64}]$
- The (S)PRP security of $\mathcal{W}$ is defined as the $\min_\ell$ (S)PRP security of $\mathcal{E}^\ell$
- ¿The notion of VIL-WBC is (different and in some way) stronger than IND-CPA/CCA symmetric encryption ‽
    - Exercise: Why isn't encryption with CBC mode w/ a fixed IV a good VIL-WBC?

VIL-WBC constructions

Some various strategies have been proposed to build VIL-WBC

- Sequential two-pass (e.g. CBC-MAC feeding CTR, Bellare and Rogaway, 1999; CBC forward and backward, Houley; Matyas, 1999)
- Wide Feistel (e.g. Naor and Reingold, 1997 $\rightsquigarrow$ Mr Monster Burrito, Bertoni et al., 2014, and several others)
- Parallel Feistel (e.g. AEZ, Hoang et al., 2014)

Maybe not the easiest/fastest way, but conceptually beautiful

Conclusion

- Authentication is essential
- Most of the time, both encryption and authentication are needed
- The "modern" way: do both at the same time
- Still an active research topic (cf. the perpetual CAESAR competition $\rightsquigarrow$ `https://competitions.cr.yp.to/caesar.html`)

Appendix: a list of existing MACs

AMAC, BMAC, CMAC, DMAC, EMAC, FMAC, GMAC, HMAC, IMAC, JMAC, KMAC, LMAC, MMAC, NMAC, OMAC, PMAC, QMAC, RMAC, SMAC, TMAC, UMAC, VMAC, WMAC, XMAC, YMAC, ZMAC, PelicanMAC, SandwichMAC (see Karpman & Mennink, CRYPTO RUMP 2017 for a review)