

# Introduction to cryptology (GBIN8U16)



## Finite fields, block ciphers

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## Bits as field elements

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- ▶ Digital processing of information  $\leadsto$  dealing with bits
- ▶ Error-correcting codes, crypto  $\leadsto$  need analysis  $\leadsto$  maths
- ▶  $\Rightarrow$  bits (no structure)  $\mapsto$  field elements (math object)
  
- ▶ “Natural” match:  $\{0, 1\} \cong \mathbb{F}_2 \equiv \mathbb{Z}/2\mathbb{Z} \equiv$  “(natural) integers modulo 2”
- ▶  $\mathbb{F}_2$ : two elements (0, 1), two operations (+,  $\times$ )

## What's $\mathbb{F}_2$ like?

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- ▶ Addition  $\equiv$  exclusive or (XOR ( $\oplus$ ))
- ▶ Multiplication  $\equiv$  logical and ( $\wedge$ )
- ▶  $\Rightarrow$  “Boolean” arithmetic
  
- ▶ Fact: any Boolean function  $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$  can be computed using only  $\oplus$  and  $\wedge$
- ▶ Fact 2: ditto,  $g : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m$
- ▶ Fact 3: ditto, using NAND ( $\neg \circ \wedge$ )

## One bit is nice, but...

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- ▶ We rather need bit strings  $\{0, 1\}^n$  than single bits
- ▶ Now two “natural” matches:
  - ▶  $\mathbb{F}_2^n$  (vectors over  $\mathbb{F}_2$ )
    - ▶ Can add two vectors
    - ▶ Cannot multiply “internally” (but there’s a dot/scalar product)
  - ▶  $\mathbb{Z}/2^n\mathbb{Z}$  (natural integers modulo  $2^n$ )
    - ▶ Can add, multiply
    - ▶ Not all elements are invertible (e.g. 2)  $\Rightarrow$  only a ring

## A third way

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- ▶ Also possible:  $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$ : an *extension* field
  - ▶ Addition “like in  $\mathbb{F}_2$ ”
  - ▶ Plus an internal multiplication
  - ▶ All elements (except zero) are invertible
- ▶ Not for today!

## Why are these useful?

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- ▶ Allows to perform operations on inputs
  - ▶ E.g. adding two messages together
- ▶ Vector spaces  $\Rightarrow$  linear algebra (matrices)
  - ▶ Powerful tools to solve “easy” problems
  - ▶ (Intuition: crypto shouldn't be linear)
- ▶ Fields  $\Rightarrow$  polynomials
  - ▶ With one or more variable
  - ▶  $\Rightarrow$  Can compute differentials
- ▶ Can mix  $\mathbb{F}_2^n$ ,  $\mathbb{Z}/2^n\mathbb{Z}$  to make things “hard”
  - ▶ Popular “ARX” strategy in symmetric cryptography (FEAL/MD5/SHA-1/Chacha/Speck/...)

# Block ciphers: “simple” binary mappings

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## Block ciphers

A block cipher is a mapping  $\mathcal{E} : \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{M}'$  s.t.  $\forall k \in \mathcal{K}, \mathcal{E}(k, \cdot)$  is invertible

In practice, most of the time:

- ▶ Keys  $\mathcal{K} = \{0, 1\}^\kappa$ , with  $\kappa \in \{64, 80, 96, 112, 128, 192, 256\}$  (but e.g. 64's too short)
- ▶ Plaintexts/ciphertexts  $\mathcal{M} = \mathcal{M}' = \{0, 1\}^n$ , with  $n \in \{64, 128, 256\}$

## Note

Block cipher inputs are *bits*, not vectors; field, ring elements

# Block ciphers: for what?

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Ultimate goal: symmetric encryption

- ▶ plaintext + key  $\mapsto$  ciphertext
- ▶ ciphertext + key  $\mapsto$  plaintext
- ▶ ciphertext  $\mapsto$  ???

With *arbitrary* plaintexts  $\in \{0, 1\}^*$

Block ciphers: do that for plaintexts  $\in \{0, 1\}^n$

- ▶ (Very) small example: 32 randomly shuffled cards = 5-bit block cipher
- ▶ Typical block sizes  $n =$  “what’s easy to implement”



# Block ciphers: only a building block

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A “vanilla” block cipher is useless

- ▶ Only works on fixed-size inputs
- ▶ Is not randomized (remember?)
  - ▶ Fix  $k, x \Rightarrow \mathcal{E}(k, x)$  always the same
  - ▶  $\Rightarrow$  leaks information about repeated messages
- ▶ (Does not authenticate coms)

$\Rightarrow$  Use block ciphers with a *mode of operation*

## Randomized encryption scheme

An encryption scheme is a mapping  $\mathfrak{E} : \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{R} \times \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{M}'$  s.t.  
 $\forall k \in \mathcal{K}, \forall r \in \mathcal{R}, \mathfrak{E}(k, r, \cdot)$  is invertible

With e.g.

- ▶ plaintexts/ciphertexts  $\mathcal{M} = \mathcal{M}' = \bigcup_{\ell \leq 2^{40}} \{0, 1\}^{128\ell}$
- ▶ keys  $\mathcal{K}$
- ▶ public randomness  $\mathcal{R}$
- ▶ Encryption scheme  $\approx$  block cipher + mode of operation

# Criteria for a mode

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Not all modes are equivalent

- ▶ How much can you encrypt? (In function of  $\{0, 1\}^n$ )
- ▶ With what security?
- ▶ With what performance?
- ▶ (Do you get auth?)

Classical examples: ECB (not a mode), CBC, CTR

# ECB (not a mode, for reference)

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## Electronic Code Book mode

$m_0 || m_1 || \dots \mapsto \mathcal{E}(k, m_0) || \mathcal{E}(k, m_1) || \dots$

- ▶ Vanilla use of the block cipher
- ▶ Efficient
- ▶ No security

# CBC (classical, not so great)

## Cipher Block Chaining mode

$$r \times m_0 \| m_1 \| \dots \mapsto c_0 := \mathcal{E}(k, m_0 \oplus r) \| c_1 := \mathcal{E}(k, m_1 \oplus c_0) \| \dots$$

- ▶ Chain blocks together (duh)
  - ▶ Output block  $i$  (ciphertext) added (XORed) w/ input block  $i + 1$  (plaintext)
  - ▶ For first ( $m_0$ ) block: use random IV  $r$
- ▶ Sequential  $\rightsquigarrow$  not so efficient
- ▶ Need  $\mathcal{E}^{-1}$  to decrypt
- ▶ Security in the square root of the block size = “birthday bound” (no details for now)
  - ▶ E.g., 128-bit blocks  $\Rightarrow$  change key before encrypting  $\ll 2^{64}$  blocks

## CBC: need random IVs

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CBC is not IND-CPA if the IVs are not random

- ▶ Attacker asks  $\mathcal{E}\text{-CBC}(m)$ , gets  $r, c = \mathcal{E}(k, m \oplus r)$
- ▶ Knows that next IV =  $x$
- ▶ Sends two challenges  $m_0 = m \oplus r \oplus x, m_1 \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{M}$
- ▶ Gets  $c_b = \mathcal{E}\text{-CBC}(m_b), b \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}$
- ▶ If  $c_b = c$ , guess  $b = 0$ , else  $b = 1$

# CTR mode (classical, better)

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## Counter mode

$$r \times m_0 \| m_1 \| \dots \mapsto \mathcal{E}(k, r) \oplus m_0 \| \mathcal{E}(k, r+1) \oplus m_1 \| \dots$$

- ▶ Like a stream cipher
  - ▶ Encrypt a public counter  $\Rightarrow$  pseudo-random keystream
  - ▶ Add (XOR) the keystream and the message
- ▶ Parallel  $\leadsto$  efficient (multi-core, pipelining & all)
- ▶ “Inverse-free”: don't need  $\mathcal{E}^{-1}$  to decrypt
- ▶ Security up to the birthday bound (like CBC)
- ▶ This time,  $r$  can be known in advance (but cannot repeat!)

## Other nice modes

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- ▶ CENC (CTR-like, “beyond birthday”)
- ▶ OCB (Authenticated-Encryption (AE) mode)
- ▶ GCM (ditto)
- ▶ TAE (OCB-like w/ *tweakable* block ciphers)
- ▶ OTR (OCB-like, inverse-free)

Maybe for another day...



# Back to BCs: how do you build one?

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- ▶ Many design strategies
- ▶ Different choices possible at
  - ▶ high level (main structure)
  - ▶ low level (tiny building blocks)
- ▶ Two brief examples today: Feistel, SPN
  - ▶ In both cases: define a *round function*, iterate it many times

- ▶ A framework to extend the domain of a function (not necessarily invertible)
- ▶ Very versatile, can be used to build
  - ▶ Block ciphers (obvs.) / Hash functions
  - ▶ Modes of operation (e.g. OTR)
  - ▶ Padding schemes (e.g. OAEP)
  - ▶ S-boxes (part of block ciphers)
  - ▶ Etc.

Basic equations (two-branch Feistel):

- ▶  $(L, R) \mapsto (L' = R, R' = L \oplus F(R))$  (forward)
- ▶  $(L', R') \mapsto (L = R' \oplus F(L'), R = L')$  (backward)
- ▶  $\Rightarrow$  Don't need  $F^{-1}$  to invert (does not need to be defined!)
- ▶ Can iterate to many rounds, with possibly different  $F$ s

Then, can extend (in many ways) to more than two branches!

# A Feistel, in picture

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


Figure: 3-Round Feistel (<https://www.iacr.org/authors/tikz/>)

## We're not done, tho

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- ▶ Q.1 How to build  $F$ ?
- ▶ Q.2 How to add a key?

⇒ No single answer, but for instance

- ▶ A.1.1 Use random-looking small tables (S-boxes)
- ▶ A.1.2 Mix operations in  $\mathbb{F}_2^n$ ,  $\mathbb{Z}/2^n\mathbb{Z}$ , Boolean functions (ARX)
- ▶ A.2.1 Add a key before/after  $F$
- ▶ A.2.2 Use key-dependent  $F$
- ▶ Etc.

# The TWINE round function




Figure: One round of TWINE  
(<https://www.iacr.org/authors/tikz/>)

# One SHA-1 step




Figure: One SHA-1 step (compression function,  $\approx$  block cipher)

## Another way: Substitution Permutation Networks

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One round: compose  $S$  and  $P$  where:

- ▶  $P$  is an invertible matrix over  $\mathbb{F}_2$  (i.e.  $P \in \text{GL}_n(\mathbb{F}_2)$ )
- ▶  $S$  is not  $\mathbb{F}_2$ -linear
- ▶ (Plus add a key at some point)

Often

- ▶  $P$  is a permutation matrix
- ▶ Or a sparse matrix (e.g. composition of block diagonal and permutation)
- ▶  $S$  is made of small invertible S-boxes



# Small drawing: better than long description

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


Figure: SPN, still quite abstract

# Example: PRESENT




Figure: Two rounds of PRESENT  
(<https://www.iacr.org/authors/tikz/>)

# Example: AES

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~> blackboard

# Why not a single block cipher?

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“It’s all about context”  $\Rightarrow$  objectives?

- Fast?
- Small?
- Secure? (LOL)
- Versatile?
- Dedicated?
- Software/hardware?
- Etc.

We’ve barely scratched the surface

## Anyways, what's a secure one?

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- ▶ Let  $\text{Perm}(\mathcal{M})$  be the set of the  $(\#\mathcal{M})!$  permutations of  $\mathcal{M}$
- ▶ Ideally,  $\forall k, \mathcal{E}(k, \cdot) \stackrel{s}{\leftarrow} \text{Perm}(\mathcal{M})$
- ▶ In practice, good enough if  $\mathcal{E}$  is a “good” pseudo-random permutation (PRP):
  - ▶ An adversary has access to an oracle  $\mathcal{O}$
  - ▶ In one world,  $\mathcal{O} \stackrel{s}{\leftarrow} \text{Perm}(\mathcal{M})$
  - ▶ In another,  $k \stackrel{s}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{K}, \mathcal{O} = \mathcal{E}(k, \cdot)$
  - ▶ The adversary cannot tell in which world he lives
- ▶ Example:  $\mathcal{E}$  cannot be  $\mathbb{F}_2$ -linear (or even “close to”)

## Next week

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- ▶ Extensions of  $\mathbb{F}_2$
- ▶ LFSRs
- ▶ MACs

# References

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- ▶ Knudsen & Robshaw, *The Block Cipher Companion*
- ▶ Daemen & Rijmen, *The Design of Rijndael*