

OR COMPLEMENTARY – FINAL EXAM 2025

- This is a 2-hour and 2-page exam with 3 independent exercises.
- Approximate grading: 6 – 5 – 10.
- The quality of the presentation and argumentation will be an important element of the evaluation.
- Document allowed: one page front/back.

Exercise 1 – Random questions taken from the course. Provide short and accurate answers to the following technical questions, taken from the course or left as exercises in the course.

- a) Adjacency matrix.** Let $G = (V, E)$ a graph and A its adjacency matrix. What appears on the diagonal of A^2 ?
- b) Spectral radius.** Consider a matrix $A \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$, its spectral radius $\rho(A)$, and the induced norm $|||A||| = \max_{x \neq 0} \frac{\|Ax\|}{\|x\|}$. Show that $\rho(A) \leq |||A|||$.
- c) Decomposition.** Let X a symmetric $n \times n$ matrix. Show the equivalence: X is positive semidefinite $\iff X = L^\top L$ with $L \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$.
- d) Positive semidefinite cone.** Show that the set \mathbb{S}_n^+ of positive semidefinite matrices is a convex cone in the space \mathbb{S}_n of $n \times n$ symmetric matrices. [Bonus question: show that \mathbb{S}_n^+ is closed and that its interior corresponds to the set of positive *definite* matrices.]
- e) Convex duality.** Using the result of the previous question, explain why there is no duality gap in the pair of primal-dual problems, with $u \in \mathbb{R}^n$ and $X \in \mathbb{S}_n$

$$\begin{cases} \max_u & c^\top u \\ & W + \text{Diag}(u) \in \mathbb{S}_n^+ \end{cases} \quad \begin{cases} \min_X & \text{trace}(WX) \\ & \text{diag}(X) = c, X \in \mathbb{S}_n^+ \end{cases}$$

where $c \in \mathbb{R}^n$, $W \in \mathbb{S}_n$, and Diag/diag are the two (adjoint) operators of the course¹.

Exercise 2 – Small parametric game. Consider this game depending on the parameter $x \in \mathbb{R}$:

		Player 2	
		A	B
Player 1	A	(0.5, 0.5)	(x, 1 - x)
	B	(1 - x, x)	(0.5, 0.5)

- a)** What are the pure Nash equilibrium of this game, depending on x ?
- b)** Given $(q, 1 - q)$ a mixed strategy for Player 2, what is the expected payoff for Player 1 if he plays A? Same question if Player 1 plays B.
- c)** Following the notation of the course, let a mixed Nash equilibrium $((p^*, 1 - p^*), (q^*, 1 - q^*))$ (not a pure one, so $p^* \notin \{0, 1\}$). Show that we have: $0.5q^* + (1 - q^*)x - (1 - x)q^* - 0.5(1 - q^*) = 0$. Explain briefly why this makes sense and why this property is called “indifference”.
- d)** What are the mixed Nash equilibrium of this game, depending on x ?

¹ $\text{Diag}: \mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{S}^n$ associates, to a vector $u \in \mathbb{R}^n$, the diagonal matrix with u on the diagonal; $\text{Diag}: \mathbb{S}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^n$ associates, to a symmetric matrix X , the vector of its diagonal entries $u = (X_{11}, \dots, X_{nn})$.

Exercise 3 – Augmented Lagrangian relaxation. We start this exercise with studying the following simple optimization problem in \mathbb{R}^2

$$\begin{cases} \max & -x_1 - 2x_2 \\ & x_1 + x_2 = 3 \\ & x_1 \in [0, 2], \ x_2 \in \{0, 2\}. \end{cases} \quad (\text{P})$$

a) By observing that (P) reduces to the trivial problem

$$\begin{cases} \max & -x_1 - 4 \\ & x_1 = 1 \\ & x_1 \in [0, 2], \end{cases}$$

give the optimal solution and the optimal value of (P).

b) What is the optimal solution and the optimal value of the convexified problem ? (where the constraint $x_2 \in \{0, 2\}$ is replaced by $x_2 \in [0, 2]$).

c) Write the Lagrangian and the dual function θ associated to the dualization in (P) of the constraint $x_1 + x_2 - 3 = 0$.

d) Draw the graph of θ . Give the dual optimal solution, the dual optimal value, and the duality gap.

Let's now turn to the general framework of the course

$$\begin{cases} \max & \varphi(x) \\ & c(x) = 0, \ x \in X. \end{cases}$$

For a parameter $\rho > 0$, we define the augmented Lagrangian function by

$$L^\rho(x; u) := \varphi(x) - u^\top c(x) - \rho \|c(x)\|^2$$

and the associated augmented dual function by

$$\theta^\rho(u) := \max_{x \in X} L^\rho(x; u).$$

d) Show that $\theta^\rho: \mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \cup \{+\infty\}$ is convex. Show that for any dual variable u and any primal feasible variable $x \in X$ such that $c(x) = 0$, we have $\theta^\rho(u) \geq \varphi(x)$.

e) Fix \bar{u} and $x(\bar{u}) \in X$ such that $\theta^\rho(\bar{u}) = L^\rho(x(\bar{u}); \bar{u})$. Prove that, if $c(x(\bar{u})) = 0$, then \bar{u} minimizes θ^ρ , $x(\bar{u})$ is a primal optimal solution, and that there is no duality gap.

Augmented Lagrangians have the following nice property. Contrary to *standard* Lagrangian duality, *augmented* Lagrangian duality always zeroes the duality gap and recovers primal solutions (when ρ is large enough). The aim of this exercise is to prove this property for (P) and $\rho = 3$.

f) Write the augmented Lagrangian and the augmented dual function θ^3 (that is, θ^ρ for $\rho = 3$) associated to the dualization of $x_1 + x_2 - 3 = 0$ in problem (P). Show that θ^3 can be cast as

$$\theta^3(u) = \max\{\theta_0^3(u), \theta_2^3(u)\}$$

with two concave functions that we denote by θ_0^3 and θ_2^3 (no need to develop them explicitly).

g) Show that $\theta^3(-1) = -5$.

h) Conclude that $\bar{u} = -1$ minimizes θ^3 and that there is no duality gap.

i) Thus solving the augmented Lagrangian dual allows us to solve the primal problem! But there is no free lunch: what is the big disadvantage of augmented Lagrangian (versus the usual Lagrangian)?